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A FEW THOUGHTS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF AN
INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY
Robert E. Hirshon*
Nothing is more important to our nation than an
independent judiciary, for judicial independence goes to the very
core of our democracy. In fact, if you want to measure the level
of freedom in any country, the first thing to be determined is
whether that nation's judges are truly independent, not just from
other branches of government, but from all influences of power,
because ultimately a free society depends upon a judiciary that is
loyal only to the law.
An independent judiciary is not a given. It is like a delicate
flower that requires constant nurturing. Recently, however, our
state courts received a shock that may threaten their bloom. The
United States Supreme Court ruling in Republican Party v.
White,' which declared the "announce clause" unconstitutional,
is the culprit. This decision is likely to create a judiciary that
over time will become less independent and more beholden to
individuals. At a minimum, the Supreme Court's opinion will
open the door to the same cynical election process for state
judges that has infected the electoral processes for our two other
branches of government.
Why does this cynicism exist? Why is it at an all-time
high? In part the answer is because Americans are convinced
that special interest groups have far too much power over the
legislative and executive branches. Voter apathy and the demand
for campaign finance reform are two manifestations of this new
reality. To date, the judiciary has escaped the perception that
judges are influenced in their decisionmaking by special
interests. But how much campaign money will need to be spent,
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how many issue-advocacy ads will need to be aired, how much
negative advertising by judicial candidates will need to be
created before the public changes its mind? As Benjamin
Cardozo himself once pointed out, " [t]he great tides and
currents which engulf the rest of men do not turn aside in their
course and pass the judges by." 2 And once the public changes its
perception of how justice is determined, will the judiciary ever
get its credibility back? Our profession's own recent history
suggests that it will not.
On June 27, 1977, the United States Supreme Court
decided Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.' Balancing society's
interests in the free flow of commercial speech against the need
to regulate the legal profession, the majority of a deeply divided
Court rejected the Arizona Bar's argument that advertising
would ultimately erode true professionalism and diminish the
legal profession's reputation in the community. The last twenty-
five years have proved that majority wrong. And Chief Justice
Burger's premonition that the Court's decision would ultimately
redound both against the profession and the general public
unfortunately has turned out to be accurate-too accurate.
Quite simply, the majority in Bates failed to acknowledge
human nature. Lawyers quickly determined that the Supreme
Court had created a crack in the heretofore solid armor of
professionalism. They learned that they could advertise just like
any other trade, and in the process they found out what Madison
Avenue already knew: Some approaches sell while others do
not. Thus legal advertising became slicker in its packaging as
lawyers exuberantly pushed the envelope beyond what many
Americans considered good taste.
The American Bar Association and many state and local
bar associations did what they could to prevent misleading
advertisements and to temper the more distasteful ads, but the
die was cast. Advertising helps the bottom line and the bottom
line became what it was all about. After all, in Bates, the
Supreme Court had labeled our profession a trade. And a trade is
really a business. "If you're injured, it must be somebody else's
fault," became more than just a slogan, it became our
2. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 168 (Yale U. Press
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profession's scarlet letter. Is there any wonder why the legal
profession is one of the least respected by the public?
Fast forward exactly twenty-five years to June 27, 2002.
The Supreme Court was again asked to engage in a delicate
balance involving freedom of speech when the White case
required the justices to weigh the First Amendment against the
professional regulation of judges. Another deeply divided
majority determined that freedom of speech trumped judicial
regulation and again, the Supreme Court opened Pandora's Box.
And as with Pandora's Box, the escape of all the horribles has
yet to be cataloged.
In White the Supreme Court unequivocally stated that the
"announce clause," which prevents a candidate seeking judicial
office from announcing his or her views on disputed legal or
political issues, is unconstitutional. As a result of this ruling, our
judicial elections may soon look a lot more like our executive
and legislative races. Judicial candidates will now understand
what they have to do to unseat judges who have made unpopular
rulings: highlight those decisions and make it clear that they
disagree. It will begin subtly at first, but ultimately candidates
for judicial office will run on abortion planks, tort-reform
planks, consumer planks, business planks. The list will expand
and the money will flow.
Protectively wrapped in the White ruling, judicial
candidates will challenge each other to be more forthcoming
about their positions on controversial legal issues under the
guise of providing voters with the information that they need.
Candidates will cite the Supreme Court as having already
discredited the concept that restraint is appropriate. Special-
interest donors will be able to precisely target their financial
contributions, and special-interest money will ultimately define
the results of judicial elections. Justice will be for sale and the
states will enter a brave new world. At least one member of the
Supreme Court seems to think that the states brought this reality
upon themselves by continuing to elect judges, so I guess the
states should expect to be punished for making that mistake. But
the Supreme Court must be careful, for it too may be affected by
the new dynamic it has unleashed.
The majority and concurring justices apparently believe
that they will be immune to White's effects because their
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opinions were limited to judicial campaigns. They may be hard
pressed, however, to maintain this limitation. Indeed, the
Supreme Court most surely will have to determine, if it hasn't
already, that the "announce clause" is unconstitutional not only
in those states that elect their judges but also in those states that
appoint them. And if this is true, why should there be a
distinction between state judges and federal judges? And if there
is no distinction, the Senate confirmation process will soon
demand answers to questions that many federal judges,
including those on the Supreme Court, have been able to deflect
by pointing out that they should not make statements that
commit or appear to commit them to particular positions that
could have a bearing on cases, controversies, or issues that are
likely to come before them.
Justice Ginsburg was right. The White majority's bold
assertion that her dissenting opinion greatly exaggerated the
difference between judicial and legislative elections is
absolutely wrong. Everything in our proud history demonstrates
that the judiciary is different from the political branches of
government. The founders knew that independent judges are a
nation's most precious commodity. We must continue to treat
them as such.
